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Abstract— Data privacy is one of the key challenges faced
by enterprises today. Anonymization techniques address this
problem by sanitizing sensitive data such that individual pri-
vacy is preserved while allowing enterprises to maintain and
share sensitive data. However, existing work on this problem
make inherent assumptions about the data that are impractical
in day-to-day enterprise data management scenarios. Further,
application of existing anonymization schemes on enterprise data
could lead to adversarial attacks in which an intruder could
use information fusion techniques to inflict a privacy breach.
In this paper, we shed light on the shortcomings of current
anonymization schemes in the context of enterprise data. We
define and experimentally demonstrate Web-based Information-
Fusion Attack on anonymized enterprise data. We formulate the
problem of Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data Anonymization and
propose a prototype solution to address this problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Data privacy is one of the key challenges faced by en-
terprises today. Sensitive individual-specific information such
as customer data, employee data etc are maintained and
used for various purposes. Several instances of data privacy
breaches [1] in the recent past have resulted in financial as well
as reputation losses for enterprises. Anonymization techniques
address this problem by sanitizing sensitive data such that
individual privacy is preserved while allowing enterprises to
maintain and share sensitive data. Recently, there has been a
lot of work [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] on data anonymization schemes.
These techniques can be broadly classified into two types:
• Partitioning based anonymization schemes : The first
class of techniques guarantee privacy by partitioning the
data such that an adversary cannot uniquely identify the
individuals falling in each partition. The basic ideology
behind these techniques is blending in the crowd which
guarantees that an individual or entity cannot be distin-
guished from a minimum number of other people. K-
anonymity [2], l-diversity [4] and other work in this
line [7] achieve partitioning through generalization and
suppression techniques. On the other hand, techniques
such as [8], [9] achieve this by clustering the data.
Partitioning based solutions are mainly applied to non-
interactive scenarios where the data needs to be pub-
lished/released after anonymization.
• Perturbation based anonymization schemes : The other
class of techniques guarantee data privacy by adding
noise to the sensitive data and thus preventing identifica-
tion. Solutions in this category can be further classified
based on whether the setting considered is interactive
or not. Solutions such as [5] [6] add noise to perform
specific data mining tasks in a non-interactive setting.
More recent solutions such as [10] add randomized noise
in an interactive setting where-in the particular function
to be evaluated on the data is known apriori.
In this paper, we consider a non-interactive setting where
the data needs to be released/published. We focus on par-
titioning based schemes as they are readily applicable to
generic databases including data with categorical attributes.
Table I depicts a typical individual-specific data considered in
partitioning based anonymization literature. Observe that there
exists a classification of data attributes (as shown in Table I)
into three different types:
1) Identifier Attributes: Attributes carrying explicit iden-
tifiers such as Name, SSN etc.
2) Quasi Identifier Attributes: Attributes that could indi-
rectly lead to identification of individuals in the database
such as Age, Zipcode and Gender etc. These are also
sometimes referred to as Non-Sensitive attributes.
3) Sensitive Attributes: Attributes carrying the sensitive
information about the individuals such as Disease, In-
come etc.
Based on this classification, existing solutions assume that
the Identifier Attributes in the database are stripped prior
to the anonymization process. This was under the implicit
assumption that the identifier attributes were necessary neither
for the release nor for the intended purpose of the release.
We believe that this assumption is too restrictive and is
even impossible in some scenarios where the presence of
explicit identifiers is necessary for the intended purpose of
the anonymized release [11]. Consider the following scenario:
Enterprise Data - Example : Table II depicts a customer
database in a typical financial institution. The data contains
names of all the customers along with certain non-sensitive
and sensitive information. The non-sensitive attributes are:
Investment Volume Index (Invst Vol) to indicate the volume
of investment (number of shares traded etc.) made by the
Identifiers Quasi Identifiers Sensitive
Name SSN Zipcode Age Nationality Condition
Alice 111-111-1111 13053 28 Russian AIDS
Bob 222-222-2222 13068 29 American Flu
Christine 333-333-3333 13068 21 Japanese Cancer
Robert 444-444-4444 13053 23 American Meningitis
TABLE I
SENSITIVE DATABASE
customer in the past, Investment Amount Index (Invst Amt)
to indicate the amount of investment (amount involved in
previous trades etc.) made by the customer in the past, Cus-
tomer Valuation (Valuation) to indicate the assigned value of
the customer. The only sensitive attribute, Customer Personal
Income (Income), corresponds to the customer’s personal in-
come. Databases such as this are an integral part of enterprises
and are maintained and used for key operations everyday. In
this paper, we shall refer to them as Enterprise Databases.
The internal release of such data along with explicit iden-
tifiers (Customer Names) is a necessity for several enterprise
operations such as accounting, record keeping etc. However,
at the same time, such a release should not compromise the
privacy of sensitive information (Customer Personal Income).
Note that trivial solutions such as removal of identifiers or
use of pseudonyms are not viable in such scenarios. The key
properties here are:
• The inclusion of identifying information is necessary for
the release to serve the intended purpose.
• Sensitive data disclosure should not be compromised even
in the presence of explicit identifiers.
Name Invst Vol Invst Amt Valuation Income
Alice 8 7 4 91,250
Bob 5 4 4 74, 340
Christine 4 5 5 75,123
Robert 9 8 9 98,230
TABLE II
ENTERPRISE DATA
In the enterprise database scenario described above,
anonymizing data using existing techniques falls short in
providing adequate protection against adversarial attacks. This
is because existing techniques [2] [3] [4] make an assumption
that Identifier Attributes are stripped prior to the anonymiza-
tion process. Consider the possibility in which an adversary
(possibly an insider) is given (or otherwise acquires) access
to the anonymized release of an enterprise database. Now,
the adversary can use the identifiers present in the release
to collect auxiliary information about the individuals present
in the database from a multitude of sources such as the web
(homepages, blogs etc). The adversary could then fuse the
auxiliary information with the anonymized release to estimate
sensitive data.
Web-Based Information-Fusion Attack : Consider the
enterprise data example described earlier as shown in Table II.
One way to internally release this table is to remove the
customer salary information and publish the non-sensitive data
as it is. The problem with this approach is that one can estimate
the sensitive data based on the non-sensitive information
present in the release. The solution is to anonymize the non-
sensitive information and remove the sensitive information.
Table III shows the anonymized release of this data using par-
titioning based anonymization scheme such as K-anonymity
proposed by Sweeney et al. [2]. We use K-anonymization
as a representative of partitioning based solutions for data
anonymization as other solutions in this category produce
similar results.
Name Invst Vol Invst Amt Valuation Income
Alice [5-10] [5-10] [1-5] -
Bob [5-10] [1-5] [1-5] -
Christine [1-5] [1-5] [1-5] -
Robert [5-10] [5-10] [5-10] -
TABLE III
ANONYMIZED ENTERPRISE DATA
Table III is now deemed safe and is released internally
within the enterprise. Now, consider the scenario in which an
adversary employee Bob is granted access to this anonymized
release. Note that the release does not give Bob the sensitive
information i.e customer personal income data. However, he
has access to non-sensitive information such as the customer
valuation, investment volume etc. Bob’s goal is to use the
anonymized release to estimate the customer personal income
values. To achieve this, he uses the customer names present in
the release to search for additional information about the cus-
tomers available on the web which will help him estimate their
personal income. For example, he collects information about
the customer’s Employment, Property Holdings etc. Example
of such data collected from the web is shown in Table IV. Now,
by fusing this information with the anonymized release the
adversary can estimate the sensitive customer personal income
information. In this example, let’s say the income range for
Name Employment Property Holdings
Alice CEO, Deutsche Bank 3560
Bob Manager, Verizon 1200
Christine Assistant, NYU 720
Robert CEO, Microsoft 5430
TABLE IV
AUXILIARY DATA COLLECTED BY THE ADVERSARY
all the customers is [$40000 - $100000] and could be divided
into three classes Low [$40000 - $60000], Medium [$60000
- $80000], and High [$80000 - $100000]. Now, consider the
customer Robert. With an estimated valuation falling in the
highest range [5-10], Bob concludes that Robert falls into the
highest income category [$80000 - $100000]. By looking at
his employment and property holdings (and possibly other
auxiliary information), Bob can further improve his estimate
and conclude that Robert falls into upper category [$90000
- $100000] of the High income class. Based on this, he
estimates that Robert’s salary is the average of range [$90000
- $100000] i.e $95000. This example demonstrates, how, by
using the auxiliary information obtained from the web an
adversary could obtain a close estimate of Robert’s actual
income. Although in the above example the attacker uses his
understanding of the data to fuse the anonymized release with
web data, in reality, he could use various Information Fusion
techniques for this purpose. Information Fusion is a well-
studied paradigm in which multiple data sources are used to
improve knowledge extraction.
In the attack demonstrated above, an adversary with access
to anonymized enterprise data gleans auxiliary information
from the web and uses information fusion techniques to inflict
a privacy breach. In this paper, we refer to such an attack as
Web-Based Information-Fusion Attack on enterprise data. This
is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that this attack is an example
of an attack-model in which a human-in-the-loop inflicts a
privacy breach.
Anonymized Release Auxiliary Data 
From The Web
Estimated Sensitive Data
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Fig. 1. Web-Based Information-Fusion Attack
A. Contributions and Organization
In this paper, we demonstrate the shortcomings of exist-
ing anonymization schemes when applied to enterprise data
through the Web-Based Information-Fusion Attack. Our main
contribution is the formulation of Fusion Resilient Enterprise
Data Anonymization problem. We propose an iterative scheme
to find an optimal anonymization that offers maximum pro-
tection against such attacks for a given dataset. The rest of
the document is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the
related work to this problem. Section 3 elaborates on the Web-
Based Information-Fusion Attack and discusses the assump-
tions made regarding the attack. In Section 4, we formulate the
problem of Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data Anonymization.
We then present our solution strategy to address the problem
through incremental anonymization in Section 5. Section 6
presents experimental results by demonstrating the attack on
a real data set and presenting the prototype solution. Section
7 provides the conclusion and future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Data privacy has received a lot of attention from both
computer science and statistical research communities. In
statistical literature, studies on data confidentiality [12] [13]
propose the use of matrix masks for anonymizing data. In
the computer science literature, several recent studies [2] [3]
have been done in the context of K-anonymity. Ferrer [9]
proposed heuristic algorithms for optimal K-anonymization
on quantitative data. Several problems with k-anonymity based
partitioning techniques have been studied in [4] [7] and others.
In [4], Machanavajjhala et al. pointed to the possibility of
attacks on k-anonymized data because of lack of diversity in
the sensitive values corresponding to each partition. Later,in
[7], Li et al. provided an argument that l-diversity is neither
a sufficient nor a necessary condition to guard against attacks
on k-anonymized data. They proposed a scheme in which the
distribution of sensitive values with-in each partition should
not be far from the distribution of sensitive values in the
original data.
One of the primary challenges in data anonymization is
to take into consideration the auxiliary information (also
called external knowledge, background knowledge or side
information) that an adversary can glean from other channels.
Recent work on partitioning based techniques [4] [14] [15]
has attempted to define adversary’s background knowledge and
possible privacy breach based on this. Martin et al [14] provide
a first formal treatment of adversarial background knowledge.
They propose a language for expressing the adversary’s knowl-
edge based on conjunctive propositions. More recently, Chen
et al. [15] have attempted to fill this gap, by proposing an ex-
tension to the same language based framework. However, these
models do not consider auxiliary information obtained using
identifying information present in the anonymized release.
On the other hand, there has been some work [16] [17] [18]
on addressing the problem of anonymizing sequential releases.
The problem here is to ensure that the current release of
a particular data set does not lead to a disclosure with
respect to previous releases on the same data set. Orthogonal
to these works,in [19] Wong et al prove that adversary’s
knowledge of the anonymization algorithm could lead to a
privacy breach. In [20], Aggarwal et al. pose the problem
of adversarial rule mining attack on anonymized data. Our
work is critically different from these studies as we consider
inferential attribute disclosure based on Information Fusion
using external information sources.
III. WEB-BASED INFORMATION-FUSION ATTACK
A. Information Fusion
In this paper, we use fuzzy inferencing to build an Informa-
tion Fusion system. This section provides a brief introduction
to fuzzy inferencing and how it can be used by the adversary
to fuse the anonymized release with web-based auxiliary
information.
Fuzzy Inference is a well-studied paradigm based on fuzzy
logic, fuzzy if-then rules and fuzzy reasoning. Basically, it
provides a mechanism to map a set of inputs to a set of
outputs using a set of rules. We refer the reader to [21]
for an introduction to fuzzy inference systems. The first step
involved in creating a fuzzy inference system is to determine
the inputs and outputs. In the web-based information-fusion
attack, the inputs include all the data attributes available to
the adversary through: 1. The anonymized release and 2.
The auxiliary data collected through the web. In our running
example from Section 1, the attributes Investment Volume
Index, Investment Amount Index, Customer Valuation from the
anonymized release in Table III form the first half of inputs
to the information fusion system. The attributes Employment,
Property Holdings collected from the web form the second
half of inputs. The output consists of single attribute, Customer
Personal Income, which the adversary intends to estimate. In
the second step, the adversary defines fuzzy-set definitions for
each of the input and output attributes. He then uses domain
knowledge to formulate a set of rules mapping the input fuzzy
sets to the output fuzzy sets. Figure 2 illustrates the system.
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Fig. 2. Fuzzy Inference System
B. Attacker Capability
We assume that the intruder is an insider who is given or
otherwise acquires access to the anonymized data. Thus, the
intruder has access to individual identifiers that can be used
to index into the web and other data sources. The intruder
is assumed to have the domain knowledge about the data to
perform information fusion.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section we formulate the problem of Fusion Re-
silient Enterprise Data Anonymization to address web-based
information-fusion attacks. Since it is not possible to quantify
the amount of auxiliary information the adversary can collect,
it is not practical to completely prevent such attacks. However,
by estimating the auxiliary information that an adversary could
collect, we can minimize the extent of privacy breach in case
of such an attack. This forms the primary goal of our problem
formulation: For a given sensitive dataset, we need to find an
anonymization such that the release causes minimum breach
in case of a fusion attack. On the other hand, one of the
important factors involved in data anonymization is the utility
of the release [22] [3]. The utility of an anonymized release
is a measure of usefulness of the release for the intended
purpose such as a specific task to be performed on the data
Ex. Classification etc. Several standard measures such as [22]
have been proposed in the literature to compute data utility.
Hence, the secondary goal of our problem formulation is to
maximize data utility. With these goals in hand, we proceed
to formulate the overall goal as follows:
Let P = {pij}m×n be a sensitive private dataset defined
over a finite set of attributes {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}.
Let Q = {qij}r×s be the auxiliary data gathered by the in-
truder from the web over a set of attributes {Q1, Q2, . . . , Qs}.
Now, let P ′ be a candidate anonymization of P .
Let F be an information fusion system that takes in P ′ and
Q as inputs and produces Pˆ , an estimate of P .
Let U be a measure of utility of P ′.
Goal : The goal of Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data
Anonymization is to compute a P ′ from P such that:
1) P ′ is resilient to Web-based Information Fusion Attacks.
2) The utility U offered by P ′ meets the release require-
ments.
To formulate the problem based on the above goal, we need
to quantify the resilience to web-based information-fusion
attacks. We define this using the following definitions:
Definition 1 Dissimilarity (D1 ◦D2) For two datasets D1
and D2 representing the same set of individuals and the same
set of attributes, D1◦D2 is a measure of dissimilarity between
them.
For two datasets {D1}m×n and {D2}m×n representing the
same set of individuals, we compute the dissimilarity using
mean square distance D1 and D2:
D1 ◦D2 =
1
m
∗ Tr((D1 −D2)
T (D1 −D2))
where m is the total number of records in each database and
Tr(A) of a matrix A is the trace of A, i.e the sum of the
elements of the main diagonal.
As defined earlier, Pˆ is an estimate of P made by the
adversary based on a candidate release P ′ and web-based
auxiliary data Q using the information fusion system F .
Pˆ = F (P ′, Q)
In order for privacy of P to be protected, the dissimilarity
between P and the estimate made by the adversary, Pˆ , needs to
be large. The more the dissimilarity P ◦Pˆ , the better protected
P is. Also, the dissimilarity between P and Pˆ quantifies the
protection offered by the corresponding P ′ against information
fusion attacks. Based on this, we now define a Fusion Resilient
Anonymization as:
Definition 2 Fusion Resilient Anonymization An
anonymization P ′ of a given sensitive data P is resilient to
fusion attacks if the dissimilarity (P ◦ Pˆ ) between Pˆ and P
is above a certain threshold value Tp.
So, for a candidate anonymization P ′ to be a safe release,
the corresponding (P ◦Pˆ ) needs to be above a certain threshold
value Tp. It is obvious to note that, among all the possible
anonymizations (P ′s) that satisfy this property, the one that
has maximum value of (P ◦ Pˆ ) offers maximum protection.
So, for the anonymization P ′ to offer maximum resilience to
web-based information fusion attacks, the dissimilarity (P ◦Pˆ )
needs to be maximized.
Recall that in addition to maximizing the protection against
information-fusion attacks, the utility of the release (U ),
should be maximized. Let W1 and W2 be the weights assigned
by the publisher for privacy protection against information
fusion attacks and data utility respectively. Now, the final
objective can be stated as a weighted sum of protection and
utility of the form:
W1 ∗ (P ◦ Pˆ ) +W2 ∗ U
Now, the problem can be stated as,
Problem : Given a private dataset P , web-based data Q
and an information-fusion system F , find the fusion resilient
anonymization P ′ that maximizes H = W1∗(P ◦Pˆ )+W2∗U ,
where Pˆ represents the estimate of P based on P ′ and Q using
F .
In order to solve the above optimization problem, we need
to find the optimal anonymization P ′ in the solution space
containing all possible anonymizations P ′s that satisfy the
fusion-resilient-anonymization property defined earlier. One
way to look at this solution space is to consider the set of
all anonymizations possible by anonymizing P to different
levels. Note that the definition of Anonymization Level depends
on the specific anonymization scheme to be employed. For
example, in K-anonymization, the value of k represents the
anonymization level. The more the value of k is, the more
the anonymization level. As mentioned in Section 1, in our
work, we use K-anonymization as the basic anonymization
scheme. For a given dataset P , let i denote the anonymization
level and P ′i denote the release obtained by anonymizing P
to level i. We use the discernibility metric defined in [22] to
measure the utility of a k-anonymized data set. The metric can
be mathematically stated as follows.
CDM (g, k) =
∑
∀|E|≥k
|E|2 +
∑
∀|E|<k
|D| ∗ |E|
where E refers to the clusters or equivalence classes of the
data set induced by k-anonymization of g using the value k.
The reader is referred to the original paper for further details.
Based on the above definition, let the utility of P ′i be denoted
by Ui. The optimization function H can now be defined based
on anonymization level i as:
Hi = W1 ∗ (P ◦ Pˆi) +W2 ∗ Ui
Let Tu be the minimum utility required for the release. Now,
the above generic problem statement can be instantiated as:
Problem Statement: Find P ′iopt , such that
Hiopt = max
∀i
Hi
where, (P ◦ Pˆi) ≥ Tp and Ui ≥ Tu.
V. SOLUTION
In this section we propose a simple iterative algorithm to
find the fusion resilient anonymization for a given sensitive
dataset. The strategy is to take any basic anonymization
scheme such as k-anonymization and incrementally anonymize
the data. The level of anonymization is increased in steps
(increase k in steps), until the utility of the release falls below
a threshold. In each step, the web-based fusion attack is sim-
ulated to find whether the resulting candidate anonymization
offers enough protection. If yes, the candidate anonymization
is retained, otherwise it is discarded. This results in a set of
all candidate anonymizations present in the solution space. We
then search for the optimal anonymization level that offers the
maximum weighted sum of protection and utility. Figure 3
illustrates our approach.
Algorithm 1 presents this solution in procedural format
as FRED Anonymization (Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data
Anonymization). The algorithm uses the Basic Anonymization
procedure that takes a sensitive data and level of anonymiza-
tion as inputs and produces an anonymization of the input data
to the corresponding anonymization level. For this, any basic
anonymization algorithm such as the ones proposed in [9] [3]
can be used to generate a k-anonymization. Note that in case
of k-anonymization the minimal level of anonymization is
achieved by using the value k = 2. The algorithm uses the
Basic Anonymization procedure to anonymize the sensitive
data for increasing values of the anonymization level (level).
The stopping condition for this loop is achieved when the
utility of anonymized result (P ′) denoted by Ulevel falls below
the threshold Tu. In each iteration, the algorithm simulates an
information fusion attack to produce the estimate an adversary
could obtain (Pˆlevel). The dissimilarity between the estimated
values Pˆlevel and the original values P is computed using
the procedure Dissimilarity Measure which takes two datasets
as input and outputs the dissimilarity value as described
in Section 4. At this point, the dissimilarity is compared
against a threshold value Tp to check if the anonymization
offers enough protection against information fusion attacks.
If yes, the weighted sum of dissimilarity and utility is com-
puted and stored as H(i). Finally, the algorithm searches
for the anonymization level i that offers the maximum value
for the weighted sum of protection and utility Hmax. The
anonymization P ′iopt corresponding to Hmax is the fusion re-
silient anonymization of the original data that offers maximum
weighted protection as well as utility.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section we present experimental results by demon-
strating the web-based information-fusion attack on a real-life
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Fig. 3. Fusion Resilient Enterprise Data Anonymization
Algorithm 1 FRED Anonymization
1: P ← Sensitive Data
2: Q ← Web Data
3: F ← Information Fusion System
4: Tp ← Protection Threshold
5: Tu ← Utility Threshold
6: W1 ← Protection Weight
7: W2 ← Utility Weight
8: level ← −1
9: i ← 0
10: repeat
11: level ← level+ 1
12: P ′level ← Basic Anonymization(P , level)
13: Pˆlevel ← F (P ′level, Q)
14: P ◦ Pˆlevel ← Dissimilarity Measure(P, Pˆlevel)
15: Ulevel ← Utility(P ′level)
16: if (P ◦ Pˆi) ≥ Tp then
17: H(i)← W1 ∗ (P ◦ Pˆlevel) +W2 ∗ Ulevel
18: i ← i+ 1
19: end if
20: until Ulevel ≥ Tu
21: imax ← i− 1
22: Hmax ← H(0)
23: for i = 1 to i = imax do
24: if H(i) ≥ Hmax then
25: iopt ← i
26: end if
27: end for
28: return P ′iopt
dataset. The goals here are to quantify the information gained
by the adversary through information fusion and demonstrate
the FRED Anonymization algorithm.
A. Setup
The sensitive data (P ) is collected from a real-life enterprise
(a public university) and contains salary information and
performance review numbers of the employees (faculty). The
employee Salary is the sensitive attribute while the perfor-
mance review numbers are the non-sensitive attributes. The
data is anonymized (P ′) so as to suppress all of the salary
information and k-anonymize the non-sensitive attributes using
microaggregation based k-anonymization proposed in [9]. The
external data(Q) is collected from the employee web pages
and external links from there. Based on domain knowledge,
we formulate a simplistic set of knowledge rules to fuse P ′
and Q and build a fuzzy inference system to estimate the
employee salary as illustrated in Figure 2. All the rules are
assigned uniform weights.
All the experiments were implemented using Matlab on a
PC with Intel Pentium 4 (1.8GHz) processor and 1GB of RAM
running Microsoft Windows XP.
B. Information Gain
Our first study aims to quantify the information gain ob-
tained by the attacker in estimating the sensitive data P , by
introducing web-based auxiliary information Q. Consider the
adversary’s knowledge of the original data at two stages 1. Be-
fore information fusion, and 2. After information fusion. Recall
that to start with, the adversary has access to the anonymized
release P ′. The adversary then collects Q and fuses this with
P ′ to obtain Pˆ . So, before performing information fusion, the
adversary’s (best) knowledge about the original data is the
anonymized version itself, i.e P ′ (in the absence of Q). In
this case, we have the dissimilarity between the original and
the adversary’s estimate (P ◦ Pˆ ) == (P ◦P ′). Figure 4 plots
this (P ◦P ′) for increasing values of k. It is not surprising to
observe that the dissimilarity increases as k increases, since
the level of anonymization increases with k. After performing
information fusion, the adversary obtains Pˆ by fusing P ′ with
Q using F . Figure 5 plots this (P ◦ Pˆ ) for increasing values
of k. Notice that (P ◦ Pˆ ) is lesser than (P ◦P ′) for all values
of k. In other words, the estimate made by the attacker (Pˆ )
after information fusion is closer to (P ) than when compared
to the estimate available before information fusion (P ′). The
difference between (P ◦P ′) and (P ◦Pˆ ) is precisely the amount
of information gained by the adversary through information
fusion. Hence, the Information Gain G of the adversary is the
difference between the closeness of the estimates available
before and after information fusion.
G = (P ◦ P ′)− (P ◦ Pˆ )
Figure 6 plots G for increasing values of k. It is interesting
to observe that G does not necessarily increase with k. This
implies that as the level of anonymization increases, the
information gained by the attacker decreases. The reason for
this is that as the level of anonymization increases, the input
(P ′) to the information fusion system gets worse and thus
forces the system to output incrementally bad estimates.
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C. Optimal Anonymization
We now study the fusion resilient enterprise data
anonymization that leads to maximum weighted sum of pro-
tection and utility as formulated in Section 4. We use the
discernibility metric defined in [22] to measure the utility
of a k-anonymized data set. The basic idea here is to assign
each data sample (or vector) a cost based on the number of
data vectors it is indistinguishable from, or in other words, the
size of the cluster it falls into. If the cluster size it falls into
is greater than k, then the cost assigned is equal to the size
of the cluster. If the cluster size is less than k, then the cost
is much severe (since it does not adhere to the definition of
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k-anonymity) and is equal to the product of the size of the
whole data set and the size of the cluster.
Ci =
{
|E|2 if |E| ≥ k
|D| ∗ |E| otherwise
}
Using this definition, we define the utility of the data set U =
{ui1}m×1 as a column matrix where each entry is the inverse
of the cost assigned to the corresponding data point.
ui1 = 1/Ci
To show how utility of the release varies with increasing level
of anonymization (increasing values of k), we calculate the
utility of the entire release using the discernibility definition
[22] as:
CDM (k) =
∑
∀|E|≥k
|E|2 +
∑
∀|E|<k
|D| ∗ |E|
Uk = 1/CDM (k)
Figure 7 plots Uk for increasing values of k. It is straight-
forward to observe that utility of data decreases as k increases.
The goal now is to find the optimal k value such that the
resulting anonymization offers maximum weighted sum of
privacy protection and utility formulated as:
H =
1
m
∗ Tr((P ◦ Pˆ )TW1(P ◦ Pˆ )) +
1
m
∗ Tr(UTW2U)
We establish the threshold values for protection and utility as
Tp = 3.075 Tu = 0.0018 based on experimental observations.
For these threshold values, we obtain the solution space of
k = 7 to 14. We assign equal weights to privacy protection
and utility i.e W1 = W2 = 0.5, Wi = 0.5m×ni.e . Based
on this setup, Figure 8 plots H for increasing values of k
within the solution space. By running an optimization for the
maximum value of H , we obtain the result k = 12. This is
the optimal k value that provides the maximum weighted sum
of protection and utility.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we establish two problems encountered in
privacy preserving enterprise data management:
1) Enterprise Data anonymization involves minimizing data
disclosure in the presence of explicit individual-identifier
information.
2) Existing anonymization techniques fall short in pro-
tecting enterprise data privacy in case of adversarial
information fusion.
We defined the Web-Based Information-Fusion Attack where-
in an adversary uses information fusion techniques to fuse
anonymized data with publicly available information from the
web to inflict a privacy breach. Our experimental demonstra-
tion of the attack present the practicality and easiness with
which such attacks might lead to revelation of sensitive data.
We formulate the problem of finding a fusion resilient data
anonymization and propose a simple solution to address this
problem. While it is not possible to entirely prevent fusion
based privacy attacks, one can minimize the extent of breach
possible through intelligent data anonymization.
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